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Abstract 
 
The spatial dimension of agricultural production is important when a communicable disease 
enters a region. This paper considers two sorts of biosecurity risk that producers can seek to 
protect against. One concerns the risk of spread: that neighboring producers do not take due care 
in protecting against being infected by a disease already in the region. In this case, producer 
efforts substitute with those of near neighbors. For representative spatial production structures, 
we characterize Nash equilibrium protection levels and show how spatial production structure 
matters. The other sort of risk concerns entry: that producers do not take due care in preventing 
the disease from entering the region. In this case, producer heterogeneity has subtle effects on 
welfare loss due to strategic behavior. Efforts by producers complement, suggesting that inter-
farm communication will help to redress the problem. 
 
Keywords: circle and line topologies, complements and substitutes, epidemic, public good.  
 
JEL classification: D20, H4, Q1 
Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease 
The control of communicable diseases has been an economic concern since at least the beginning 
of recorded history. While our understanding of biology has expanded dramatically in recent 
times, damage from such diseases and the costs of prevention remain a great concern to society. 
And the concern is not entirely about human diseases. An outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 
the United Kingdom in 2001 led to widespread disruption of civic life, especially in rural areas. 
This disease poses a remote concern for human health, but other communicable non-human 
diseases present larger risks. Strong consensus in the scientific community about the mutability 
and virulence of avian influenza has generated a global response in control and prevention, circa 
2005.  
These are examples of longstanding and recurrent problems that motivated the establishment 
of the OIE, what is now called the World Organization for Animal Health, in 1924. It works in 
collaboration with the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health Organization, 
both United Nations agencies, but has a more focused remit. Viewing veterinary services as a 
global public good vital for maintaining trade flows, the OIE has sought to provide a more 
transparent picture of global animal diseases, facilitate the transfer of veterinary information, 
foster cohesive international responses to disease control, and strengthen national disease control 
infrastructure.1 Its routine activities include issuance of animal health code recommendations on 
such items as choice of production site, facilities design, environmental and manure management 
practices, record keeping, and protocols for entry onto premises. These biosecurity measures 
promote the public good in impeding the rate of spread across space but come at a private cost to 
growers. Infectious plant diseases are also a global concern, and natural forces are not the only 
propagators of infectious disease. Strong evidence has led some countries to believe that 
biological agents may be used as a tactic to cause physical harm and social disruption.  
                                                 
1 See Otte, Nugent, and McLeod (2004) for extensive discussions on public good features of 
infectious animal diseases. 
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Two important features of communicable diseases are that they spread spatially and that 
actions by private parties to reduce spread are possible but at a cost. Recognition of these 
features is often manifested in public policies to prevent and control an outbreak. Ports, areas 
suspected of being infected, and their environs are often isolated. Public entities impose 
behavioral mandates and support information campaigns to encourage actions that will disrupt 
spread in any outbreak. The intent of this paper is to gain a better understanding of private 
incentives to protect against the introduction and spread of an infectious agricultural disease. We 
will do so by developing a model that emphasizes spatial relation in infection, the technology of 
prevention, and externalities across agent payoffs to biosecuring actions in a susceptible region. 
The literature on the economics of communicable disease, though extensive, is not clearly 
focused on characterizing the nature of external problems that would motivate public 
involvement (Otte, Nugent, and McLeod, 2004). A surprisingly small body of work exists on the 
economics of communicable human diseases, notably in Geoffard and Philipson (1996, 1997) 
and Kremer (1996). Animal diseases have been the subject of formal models in McInerney 
(1996) and Chi et al. (2002), but the issue was on internal costs and not on how farms inter-
relate. Mahul and Gohin (1999) provide a dynamic model of contagion that emphasizes sunk 
costs that may be incurred upon taking public action to control spread. A strongly related theme 
is that of controlling invasive species. Economic perspective on this issue is expanding rapidly 
but has been confined largely to public behavior given an assumed exogenous stochastic 
dynamic process for infection; see Olson and Roy (2002), Perrings (2005), and Shogren and 
Tschirhart (2005).2 
The findings in Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005) are closest to those in the present 
work. The biosecuring decisions in that paper are whether to trade in young stock and the extent 
of production. Private benefits from trade in immature animals are shown to lead to socially 
                                                 
2 But see Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman (2002), where the privately optimal barrier width is 
considered when seeking to protect against Pierce’s disease in vineyards. While spatial, theirs is 
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excessive losses from an endemic communicable disease. Furthermore, communicable disease is 
shown to alter the format and scale of production. The model is not spatial and the analysis 
applies most directly to the extent of damage from a disease already entrenched in a region.  
This paper provides a spatial model of private behavior to prevent the introduction and 
subsequent spread of infection. The emphasis is on protecting a farm’s borders. We develop two 
variants on a model in which the nature of spatial production is explicitly specified. In the first 
variant, the emphasis is on the spread of a disease that has already entered. For farms arranged in 
a circle, we show how biosecuring actions are local substitutes and explain what this means for 
behavioral patterns under simultaneous-moves Nash equilibrium. We also consider a linear 
arrangement of farms in order to show how the model can be adapted, and to show how 
locational asymmetries can affect incentives to protect farm boundaries.  
By contrast with actions to protect against spread, farm-level actions to protect against entry 
into the region are shown to be strategic complements. It is shown that all farms can benefit from 
compulsory actions to secure against entry, but it may only be necessary to compel the most 
efficient subset of producers because the others may follow of their own accord. 
Complementarity also opens up possibilities for veterinary authorities and/or private industry 
groups to use communication networks in better securing a region against disease entry. It is 
suggested that some producers should seek to communicate their biosecuring behavior to others 
in order to coax further effort out of other farms in the region. 
 
Model 
A region has 5N ≥  farms labeled {1,2, ... , } Nn N∈ =Ω , and each farm is seeking to protect 
production to the value of 0nV > .3 A farm infected by a disease loses all of this value. The farms 
are located on a circle; see figure 1. The circle topology was chosen because farms are 
                                                                                                                                                             
not an equilibrium model in the sense that grower interactions are not accounted for. 
3 On 5N ≥ , see footnote 4 below. 
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locationally symmetric on it. We could develop our model under a different spatial structure, and 
we will later illustrate with a linear spatial structure. But the circular topology facilitates in 
making most of the points we wish to make in this work.  
Infection is very rare and can enter the region at some farm with probability θ , where each 
farm is equally likely to be the first infected. By “rare” we mean it is almost certainly true that at 
most one farm inside the region becomes infected from outside the region at any time. The first 
farm to be infected within a region is labeled as the “originating farm.” It will also be assumed 
that public authorities intervene to suppress a disease outbreak after the disease spreads to no 
more than the four most proximate farms (two on each side), if indeed it spreads at all.4 Farm-
level caretaking is modeled through actions taken at the farm border. If infection has reached one 
of its direct neighbors, the farm will become infected with probability [0,1]na ∈ . We say that the 
nth farm takes comparatively less (more) care when the value of na  is comparatively high (low). 
The grower can change this probability at a cost. Before considering cost of protection, however, 
let us look at the expected losses in revenue.  
Farm 1 may be the first infected, and this occurs with probability θ . Or it may contract the 
disease from a neighbor. Clockwise is farm 2. If farm 2 is infected first, then farm 1 becomes 
infected through farm 2 with probability 1aθ . The originating farm’s probability does not enter 
the calculation because we assume a farm has no incentive to try to prevent the disease from 
exiting the farm. Counterclockwise is farm N . If it is infected first, then farm 1 becomes 
infected with probability 1aθ . Farms 3 and 2N −  may also be the source of infection to farm 1, 
where the respective probabilities that this occurs are 1 2a aθ  and 1 Na aθ . The overall probability 
that farm 1 is infected is 1 1 2 12 Na a a a aθ θ θ θ+ + + . 
                                                 
4 The five-at-most assumption on the extent of the outbreak is convenient but could be relaxed at 
only the cost of substantially more tedious algebra. Requirement 5N ≥  avoids having to remove 
double-counting, where the disease spreads to farms in both clockwise and counterclockwise 
directions. 
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In order to develop a general expression for the risk of infection for each farm Nn∈Ω  we 
define [ ]n i n i zN+ = + −  where z  is an integer chosen such that [ ] Nn i+ ∈Ω . That is, clock 
algebra (also called modular algebra) is used. For the nth farm, the probability of infection is 
(1) [ 1] [ 1]2 .n n n n n na a a a aω θ θ θ θ+ −= + + +  
The overall expected loss in revenue to the region is  
(2) .
N
n nn
V ω∈Ω=∑R  
Finally, a prevention technology exists. Firms differ in their capacity to protect themselves 
and the cost of protection at entry probability level na  is ( )
n
nC a , a decreasing function. Private 
profit to a farm is ( )nn n n n nV V C aω= − −L , while the overall expected profit to the region is  
(3) .
N
nn∈Ω=∑L L  
We assume the region produces a small share of overall market output, so that consumer surplus 
may be ignored and L  represents social surplus. Since actions by farms [ 1]n +  and [ 1]n −  enter 
nL  through nω , externalities exist and one should not expect market competition to support the 
maximization of (3).  
 
Internal Security; Preventing Spread  
In order to better understand protection incentives, we posit that the nth farm’s cost of protection 
is Ln( )n naα−  where 0nα > . This ensures that the cost of not protecting at all is Ln(1) 0nα− =  
while the cost of complete protection, where 0na = , is infinite. This, we believe, reflects reality 
to the extent that not protecting at all requires no expenditure, complete protection is 
prohibitively expensive, and the protection cost increases with an increase in the extent of 
protection. 
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Private Incentives 
The nth farm’s profit is  
(4) Ln( ), .n n n n n n NV V a nω α= − + ∈ΩL  
Insert (1) into (4) and differentiate to obtain 2 / 0 , ,n k s Na a k s k s∂ ∂ ∂ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω ≠L , i.e., farm 
biosecurity actions to prevent the spread of infection are strategic substitutes. This observation is 
noteworthy because it shows that the game being played is not of the type involving global 
strategic complementarities (Vives, 1990, 2005; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). As we will see 
when studying external disease risks, where global complementarities do exist, the existence of 
complementarities provides policymakers with clear opportunities to strengthen defenses against 
disease risks. When private actions may substitute, however, the possibility exists that a public 
intervention can do more harm than good by indirectly discouraging important actions while 
directly encouraging less important actions.  
 
Responses 
From Nash conjectures on payoffs (4), the level of protection is chosen as a solution to  
(5) 
[ 1] [ 1]
( ) 0 ;
( ) (2 ) .
n
N
nn n
n n n
n n
a n
d
a V a a
da a
μ
αμ θ + −
= ∀ ∈Ω
= = − + + +L  
Solutions are denoted by *na . Letting τ  represent some exogenous parameter and assigning nλ  
/[ ]n nVα θ= , (5) differentiates as  
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(6) 
1 1
* 2 *
1 1
*
2 21
* 2 **
2 22
*
3 33
* 2 *
3 3
*
* 2 *
11 0 1
( )
/ 11 1 0
( ) /
/ 10 1 0
( )
/
11 0 0
( )
N
N N
N N
d
a a d
dda d
a a dda d
dda d
a a d
da d
d
a a d
λ λ
τ
λ λτ
ττ
λ λτ
τ
τ
λ λ
τ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜− −⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
.
⎟⎟⎟
 
Local stability is satisfied if all eigenvalues of the N N×  matrix have negative real parts, and we 
make this assumption (McKenzie, 1960; Dixit, 1986; Brualdi and Shader, 1995). 
Example 1. If n Nnα α= ∀ ∈Ω  and n NV V n= ∀ ∈Ω , with /[ ]Vλ α θ= , then one solution is 
that of equal-actions, * *n Na a n= ∀ ∈Ω , so that the only non-negative equal-actions solution to 
system (5) is5 
(7) * 0.5 1 2 0.5.a λ= + −  
This is interior whenever (0,4)λ∈ . The diagonal dominance sufficient condition for stability 
(Dixit, 1986) is assured in this case, since * 2/( ) 2aλ >  implies 1 2 1λ+ > .  
If 1τ λ= , so that just one parameter changes from the common value of λ , then (6) 
becomes6  
                                                 
5 We know very little about solutions when the nλ  differ. One observation is that 1 *
N
nn
N a− ∈Ω∑  
1 * * 1
[ 1]
N N
n n nn n
N a a N λ− −+∈Ω ∈Ω+ =∑ ∑ , i.e., solutions live on a curve such that the sum of the mean 
value of *na  and a spatial correlation statistic will not be affected by movements along the 
parameter simplex with fixed 
N
nn
λ∈Ω∑  value. Public goods analyses and imperfect competition 
analyses, as in Salant and Shaffer (1999) or Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001), have 
exploited related solution invariances but we do not see an opportunity for doing so in this case.  
6 Were the outbreak allowed to extend beyond five farms, then more entries on the square matrix 
of equation (8) would be non-zero and the matrix would not be as readily inverted. Main-
diagonal and other symmetries of the square matrix facilitate inversion, so it would be easiest to 
generalize while retaining as much symmetry as possible. 
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(8) 
( )
*
1 1
*
2 1
*
3 1 *
*
1
1 2 0 1/
1 2 0 0/
1 ;0 1 2 0 0/
0 0 1 2 0/
1 2 1 2 1 2 12 0; 0.
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
N
da d
da d
da d
a
da d
ξ ξ ξ λ
ξ ξ ξ λ
κ ξ ξ λ
ξ ξ λ
λ λ λ λκ ξλ λ λ λ
+ − − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− + − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟× =− + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ − + + − −= > = <⎜ ⎟+ − + + − +⎝ ⎠
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ??
?
 
The system inverts as7  
(9) 
* 1 2 2 1
1 1
* 1 1 2 2
2 1
* 2 2 1 3 3
3 1 *
* 1 2 2 3 3
1
1/ 1
0/ 1
1 0/ 1
( 1)
0/ 1
N N N N
N N N N
N N N N
N
N N N N
N
da d
da d
da d
a
da d
λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρκ ρ
λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + + + ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + + + +Δ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + + + + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
?
?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ?
?
1
2 2
*
1
1
1 ,
( 1)
N
N
N
N
N
a
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρκ ρ
ρ ρ
−
−
−
⎟
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= +Δ − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
?
 
where ( ) ( )¼(1 2 ) 1 2 1 / 1 2 1 1ρ λ λ λ λ λ⎡ ⎤= + + + − + − − < −⎣ ⎦  and ¼(1 2 ) 0λ −Δ = + > . In this 
case, since 0κ > , * 0a > , 0Δ > , and 1ρ < − , a small subsidy to any one grower will increase 
the level of protection taken by that grower.  
However, if N  is even, then 1 *( ) /[ ( 1)] 0N Naρ ρ κ ρ− + Δ − <  so that the two adjacent farms 
reduce protection in response to the increase in level of a farm’s subsidy. This pattern repeats 
itself around the circle; farms at an odd minimum displacement from the subsidized farm will 
reduce protection in response to the farm-specific subsidy while farms at an even minimum 
displacement will increase protection. If N  is odd then the denominator in 
                                                 
7 This matrix inversion also appears in a study of equilibrium production schedules under 
adjustment costs by Hennessy and Lapan (2004).  
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1 *( ) /[ ( 1)]N Naρ ρ κ ρ− + Δ −  is negative while the numerator is positive since 1Nρ ρ− + =  
2( 1) 0Nρ ρ− + >  on 3N ≥ . In this case, too, the two adjacent farms will reduce protection in 
response to a subsidy on a specific farm’s protective actions. Furthermore, 
* 2( ) /[ ( 1)] ( 1)
sign
N i i N N i iaρ ρ κ ρ ρ ρ− −+ Δ − = − +  where the value of 2 1N iρ − +  is negative (positive) 
whenever / 2 ( )N i≥ < . It is the oddness of the minimal displacement from the subsidized farm 
that determines another farm’s response to the subsidy.  
 
Social Inefficiency 
From (4) and (5),  
(10) , ,
private
optimum
0.
N N
m n m n
n nm n n
m n m nm m m m m
d d dd V V V
da da da a da
ω ω α ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
≠ ≠
= − − + = − ≤∑ ∑L  
Notice, from (7), that if τ  in (6) involved a shock to all λ  coefficients along the ray n nλ λ= ∀  
N∈Ω , then (9) would have sign * / 0n Nda d nλ ≥ ∀ ∈Ω . This, together with equation (10), implies 
that subsidies on farm-level actions might be in order. However, from the peculiarities of 
responses in (9), it is plausible to suspect that a subsidy may not always increase welfare.8   
 
Linear Topology 
The intent of this subsection is to demonstrate the robustness of the modeling approach. To this 
end, we will replace the circular production structure with a three-farm linear topology. The 
farms are now located along a line segment, as illustrated in figure 2. In contrast with the circular 
topology, physical barriers (river, mountain, desert, … ) preclude direct spread from farm 1 to 
farm 3. For edge farms 1n =  and 3n = , infection can only come from one side. Farm profits are  
                                                 
8 For example, when actions are not equal in equilibrium then it is conceivable that a uniform 
subsidy on all actions depresses an important action to such an extent that overall welfare 
declines. In our inquiries, we did not identify analytic conditions under which this occurred. 
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(11) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
Farm 1: Ln( );
Farm 2 : 2 Ln( );
Farm 3: Ln( ).
V V V a V a a a
V V V a a
V V V a V a a a
θ θ θ α
θ θ α
θ θ θ α
− − − +
− − +
− − − +
 
Upon setting 1 2 3V V V V= = = , done for convenience, and denoting /[ ]n n Vλ α θ= , the private 
(pure-strategy) optimality conditions may be written as  
(12) 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 3Farm 1: ; Farm 2 : 2 ; Farm 3: ;a a a a a a aλ λ λ+ = = + =  
yielding unique pure-strategy solution 
(13) 
2*
2
2 2*
2
2 if 2 2 ,
2 min[2, ]Farm {1,3}:
1 otherwise;
0.5 if [0,2],
Farm 2 :
1 otherwise.
n
n
nn a
a
λ λ λλ
λ λ
⎧ ≤ +⎪ +∈ = ⎨⎪⎩
∈⎧= ⎨⎩
 
Notice the bias in the middle; if 1 2 3 2λ λ λ λ= = = ≤ , then * * * * *1 3 2 2 22 /[1 ]a a a a a= = + ≥  so that farm 
2 takes most care. This is because the middle farm is immediately vulnerable to direct infection 
from the other two farms, whereas the edge farms are only immediately vulnerable to direct 
infection from the middle farm. Two failures must occur for one edge farm to infect the other. 
The sum of surpluses for an interior solution is  
(14) 
* * * * * * *
1 2 3 1 2 3 2
* * *
1 1 2 2 3 3
31
1 2 3 1 2 2 3
2 2
3 3 ( 2 )
Ln( ) Ln( ) Ln( )
223 3 ( ) Ln Ln(0.5 ) Ln .
2 2
W V V V a a a Va a Va a
V a V a V a
V V V V V V
θ θ θ θ
θ λ θ λ θ λ
λλθ θ λ λ λ θ λ θ λ λ θ λλ λ
= − − + + − −
+ + +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − + + + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
A subsidy on the cost for farm 1 in the form of some intervention that decreases the value of 1α  
has welfare effect 1 1 2/ Ln[2 /(2 )] 0
sign
dW dλ λ λ− = − + ≥ . This, reassuringly, means that welfare 
increases with a subsidy. A subsidy directed toward farm 2 has welfare effect 2/
sign
dW dλ− =  
1 3 2 2( ) /(2 ) Ln(0.5 )λ λ λ λ+ + − . This is also positive for interior solutions, 2 [0,2)λ ∈ . 
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As for first-best, the social optimality conditions are 
(15) 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 2
3 3 2 3
Farm 1: ; Farm 2 : 2 ;
Farm 3: .
a a a a a a a a
a a a
λ λ
λ
+ = + + =
+ =  
To illustrate, when 1 2 3λ λ λ λ= = =  then any first-best solution must satisfy 1 3fb fba a= .9  The 
first-best requirement on the middle farm is 22 2(1 0.5 ) 0.5 0a aλ λ+ + − =  with unique positive 
solution  
(16) 
2
2
1 0.5 (1 0.5 ) 2
.
2
fba
λ λ λ− − + + +=  
Notice that 2 / 0
fbda dλ ≥  and 2Lim 1fbaλ→∞ = . In contrast with (13) where no protection is 
sometimes privately optimal, farm 2 should make no effort only when cost of effort becomes 
infinite. Comparing with Nash conjectures choice *2 0.5a λ= , we have  
(17) 
* * 2 *
2 2 22
* *
2 2
1 (1 ) 4
1
2
fb a a aa
a a
− − + + += ≤  
since * 2 * * 22 2 2(1 ) 4 (1 3 )a a a+ + ≤ + . Even though it takes most care, the middle farm does not 
protect enough. 
For the edge farms, first-best actions are 
(18) 1 3 2
2 ,
1 0.5 1 3 0.25
fb fba a λλ λ λ= = − + + +  
so that *1 1
fba a≤  if 2 22.25 0.25λ λ≤ , a false statement. Thus, the edge farms react by protecting 
too much even though they take less care than does the middle farm. Observe too that 1
fba  and 
3
fba  are increasing in λ  along 1 2 3λ λ λ λ= = = , with 1 3 1fb fba a= =  at 4 / 3λ = . By contrast with 
                                                 
9 Fixing 2a  at any admissible value, W in (14) is symmetric and concave in the choices of 1a  and 
3a . This means that any admissible choice 1 3( , )
fb fba a  such that 1 3
fb fba a≠  delivers lower welfare 
than 1 3 1 3 1 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) (( ) / 2,( ) / 2)
fb fb fb fb fb fba a a a a a= + + , a contradiction since convexity of the action space 
ensures that the average is admissible. 
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the middle farm, it may be optimal for the edge farms to make no effort. This is because the 
middle farm’s action is a substitute and the middle farm takes appropriate care in first-best. 
 
External Security; Preventing Entry 
To this point the focus has been on preventing the spread of infection within a region. We turn 
now to actions that prevent entry. As before, each farm in Nn∈Ω  seeks to protect value to the 
extent nV . Now, however, the biosecuring action each farm can take pertains to entry into the 
region. The behavior under consideration might involve careless importation of assets such as 
livestock and equipment, or allowing visits onto a farm by bird, rodent, and human disease 
carriers.  
Each farm can increase the probability the farm is not the originating farm from 1σ θ= −  to 
1. The cost of this action to each farm is 0nc ≥ , and an infected farm loses all of nV . Farm 
biosecurity costs and the values farms seek to protect are assumed to be common knowledge. In 
this section we control for the issue of intra-region spread by assuming the disease immediately 
spreads to all the region’s farms if it enters. This means that all farms need to succeed in not 
being the originating farm if their own produce is to be spared.  
When no farm in the region incurs the cost then the expected profit to the nth farm is NnV σ , 
while if k  other farms incur the cost then the probability that the disease does not enter is N kσ −  
and the expected profit to a non-acting farm is N knV σ − . Profit to the farm depends upon whether 
the farm has incurred the cost. Suppose, as a Nash conjecture in a simultaneous-move game, a 
farmer assesses that it is the dominant strategy for k  other farms to incur the cost. The payoff to 
the nth farm in question is then10,11  
                                                 
10 This model is similar to, and the technical framework is largely inspired by, Winter’s (2004) 
study of motives for discrimination among identical team members under contract. The concern 
there is with optimal design of remuneration schemes to elicit joint actions. We take disease 
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(19) 
1does act: ;
Farm that  
does not act: .
N k
n n
N k
n
V c
V
σ
σ
− −
−
⎧ −⎪⎨⎪⎩
 
Without loss of generality, assign firm labels such that 1 2 ... Nρ ρ ρ≤ ≤ ≤  where /n n nc Vρ = . 
The farm does (does not) act if12  
(20) 1(1 ) ( ) .N k nσ σ ρ− − − > ≤  
Given that costs and protected values are known to all, farm 1 will be identified by all as the 
farm most likely to invest. The threshold for this farm to act is 1 1(1 )
Nσ σ ρ− − > . If this threshold 
is met, then all other firms will arrive at the conjectural conclusion that farm 1 will take the 
biosecuring action and the threshold for the second farm to act is 2 2(1 )
Nσ σ ρ− − > . In general, if 
iterated dominance arguments imply that all firms 1ni −∈Ω  act, then the threshold for the nth 
farm to act is  
(21) ( )Ln( ) (1 ) .N n ne
σ σ ρ− − >  
Figures 3 and 4 graph the left- and right-hand sides of (21) as continuous functions. In both 
graphs, the two expressions are increasing in the value of n . For nρ , monotonicity is by 
construction while for ( )Ln( ) (1 )N ne σ σ− −  monotonicity is due to a stochastic version of increasing 
returns. In figure 3, ( )Ln( ) (1 )N n ne
σ σ ρ− − =  at one value of n , n n N+= < , where we assume for 
simplicity that n+  is a natural number. Since ( )Ln( ) (1 )N ne σ σ− −  is initially smaller, however, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
state-conditional remunerations, nV  conditional on no disease, as being given and focus attention 
on the consequences for actions. 
11 The marginal private value of acting is 1N k N kn n nV V cσ σ− − −Δ = − −  with derivative /d dkΔ =  
1Ln( ) (1 ) 0N knV σ σ σ− −− − ≥ . This ensures that the game is one of strategic complementarities, in 
the manner of Vives (1990, 2005) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). We will not pursue the 
comparative statics implications of this, but do note that the theory implies that a reduction in 
any nc  weakly increases the incentive of each producer to take their respective action. The 
effects of a producer-specific subsidy on preventing entry differ markedly from a producer-
specific subsidy on preventing spread. 
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equilibrium is for no farm to make the investment. This may be unfortunate indeed, for suppose 
that the first n+  farmers are compelled by law to take the action. Then all remaining farmers will 
find it advantageous to invest, and welfare to the first farmer becomes n nV c− , rather than NnV σ . 
If 1 ( ,1]
Nρ σ∈ , then the first farm will be better off after being compelled. Similarly, if 
( ,1]Nn nnρ σ +∈ ∀ ∈Ω  then all compelled farmers will be better off for it. Indeed, all producers 
may have to be compelled to act and all may be better off when compared with absent an across-
the-board mandate. The problem is in part one of free riding and in part one of a failure to 
coordinate.13 
In figure 4, concentrate on the two fully traced curves. There, ( 1)Ln( ) 1(1 )
Ne σ σ ρ− − >  so that 
the first farm does make the investment. The investment occurs up to farm nˆ , which happens to 
be the unique point of intersection under our parameter choices. Suppose that 10
n
n e
ψρ ψ=  in 
figure 4, so that  
(22) 
1
1 0
1ˆ Ln ,
Ln( )
N N
n σ σψ σ ψ
+⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
 
where 1 Ln( ) 0ψ σ+ >  since unit costs on the marginal farm grow more rapidly than unit private 
benefits of protective actions. 
Now consider the set of first-best actions. By analog with (19), the change in social welfare 
due to action by a farm is  
(23) 
1does act: ;
Farm that 
does not act: ;
N k
n
N k
NV c
NV
σ
σ
− −
−
⎧ −⎪⎨⎪⎩
 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Here, as elsewhere in the section, ties are assigned to non-action. 
13 Under free riding, the grower would be disposed to deviate when all other growers engage in 
first-best behavior. In this case, the incentive to deviate weakens as more farms act. It remains 
the case, though, that marginal private benefit differs from marginal social benefit at first-best. 
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where 
N
nn
NV V∈Ω=∑ . Note first that the iterated dominance order in which farms behaving 
under private incentives are viewed as taking the action is not necessarily consistent with their 
marginal contributions to social welfare. It will always be the case, however, that the set acting 
under simultaneous-moves Nash behavior will act under first-best because the action threshold is 
always lower under first-best.  
If n NV V n= ∀ ∈Ω , then first-best solves ( )Ln( ) (1 ) /N n ne Nσ σ ρ− − = . Figure 4 also depicts 
how the social welfare solution compares with the solution under private incentives; see the 
broken curve. Under cost structure 10
n
n e
ψρ ψ= , the optimal number of farms acting (with least 
cost first) is given by 
(24) 
1
1 0 1
1 Ln( )ˆ ˆLn( ) Ln .
Ln( ) Ln( )
N N
fb Nn N n nσ σψ σ ψ ψ σ
+⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−= + = + >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
An expression for optimal subsidy is rather apparent; reduce a farm’s nρ  value from /n nc V  to 
/[ ]n nc NV . We will consider next the role that cost heterogeneity has on private solutions to the 
public goods problem.  
Example 2. Suppose in a two-farm region that 1 2 2V V= = , 1 1c δ= − , and 2 1c δ= + . So long 
as [0,1]δ ∈  then first-best behavior is  
(25) 
{ }
{ }
{ }
2 2
2
2
) :  none act if              4 2  and  4 4 1 ;
) :  farm 1 only acts if  4 3  and  4 1 4 ;
) :  both farms act if     3 4   and  2 4 .
A
B
C
σ σ σ δ
σ δ σ δ σ
σ δ σ
≥ ≥ + −
+ ≥ + − >
> + >
 
Figure 5 depicts the regions over ( , ) [0,1] [0,1]σ δ ∈ × . The three characterizing curves intersect at 
( , ) (1/ 2,3 2 2)σ δ = − . Area A is defined by max 1/ 2,0.5 0.5σ δ⎡ ⎤≥ +⎣ ⎦ , while area B is 
given by 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.25δ σ δ+ > ≥ − . Area C is the remaining set, min 1/ 2,0.75 0.25δ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  
σ> . It can be seen that low-cost heterogeneity ( 0δ ≈ ) favors action by both farms (area C) or 
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neither farms (area A). Indeed, if )0,3 2 2δ ⎡∈ −⎣  then action by exactly one farm is not optimal. 
If, though, 1/ 2σ ≥  then optimal behavior can only be for at most one farm to act because farm 
2 has cost of at least 1 and the social gain from acting is small whenever 1/ 2σ ≥ . 
On the other hand, in a game of simultaneous-moves on biosecuring actions,  
(26) 
{ }
{ }
{ }
2
2
2
) :  none act if              2 2 1 ;
) :  farm 1 only acts if  2 1 2   and  2 1 ;
) :  both farms act if     2 1 2   and  1 2 .
A
B
C
σ σ δ
σ δ σ σ δ
σ δ σ σ δ
′ ≥ + −
′ + − > + ≥
′ + − > > +
 
Figure 6 depicts the areas over ( , ) [0,1] [0,1]σ δ ∈ × . Area C ′  is empty since, for our cost and 
value parameters, the two conditions generate the contradiction 22 0 2 1σ σ δ≥ > + − . Area B′  
has a redundant first inequality, since 22 1 2 0σ δ σ+ − > ≥  implies 2 1σ δ+ > . The area contains 
parameter pairs such that the marginal private benefit of action by the second farm is low relative 
to the high marginal cost. The δ  interval (viewing vertical sections) for which the first farm will 
act vanishes when 0σ → . This is because the prospects of success are negligible given that the 
second farm is not biosecuring. The δ  interval in area B′  also vanishes when 1σ → , since the 
marginal private benefit of action is negligible.  
Comparing figures 5 and 6, we see that no counterpart to area C in figure 5 exists in figure 6, 
while there exist 2( , ) [0,1]σ δ ∈  values such that both farms should act but neither does act. 
Furthermore, A A′ ⊃  since 2 2 24 4 1 2 2 1 2 ( 1) 2 2 1σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ− + = − + + − ≤ − + . This means 
that the parameter set such that neither farm biosecures expands under simultaneous moves when 
compared with first-best. Areas B and B′  are not comparable since cases where two farms 
should biosecure have only one doing so and cases where one farm should biosecure have 
neither doing so. In no instance does a farm biosecure when it should not. 
The σ  and δ  parameters each have ambiguous effects on how private and optimal solutions 
relate. For low σ  and low δ  values, both farms should act while neither do. Here, the farms are 
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sufficiently similar that both farms come to the same conclusion and this is not to act. When σ  
is low and δ  is high, though, only farm 1 has the incentive to biosecure since it is too costly for 
farm 2 to do so. At intermediate σ  and high δ  values then farm 1 acts and only farm 1 should 
act, so that first-best is attained in our discrete model. Figure 7, which overlays figure 6 onto 
figure 5, identifies non-monotonicities in the welfare loss effects of parameter values. In it the 
indicators ( , )I J  give (# farms that act, # farms that should act). Two areas, check marked (? ) 
and connected only at point [1,1]  to the upper right, have sequential-move Nash equilibrium that 
support first-best. Welfare loss occurs for parameters in cross marked areas, ? . For any δ ∈  
(0.5,1) , a horizontal cross-section shows first-best being supported at intermediate and very high 
values of [0,1]σ ∈ , but not at low and high values of σ . For 1/ 2 1σ< < , a vertical cross-
section shows first-best being supported at low and high δ  values but not at intermediate values. 
Two ( , )I J  permutations do not occur. While (2,1)  is not possible given our model structure, 
(2,2)  would identify an area had we chosen 1c c δ= − , and 2c c δ= +  with c  having value 
sufficiently close to 0.  
 
Leadership in Internal and External Security Games 
As is well known, the capacity to communicate ones actions to other players in a game has 
consequences for game equilibrium. What is less clear, however, is whether society or other 
players can be better off for this. In what follows we will consider how the timing of moves 
affects incentives to engage in actions to avoid disease contraction in both our internal security 
and external security models.14  
 
                                                 
14 It is not generally true that the first mover has an advantage, and we will identify a situation in 
which the first mover is strictly worse off. See Dixit and Skeath (2004) for discussions on gains 
from order of move. 
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Internal Security 
The case of leadership in the circular topology is involved, so we will confine our analysis to 
linear topologies. Considering the three-farm linear topology, system (12) identifies that the farm 
2 reaction function is independent of actions by the other farms. The middle farm could 
manipulate behavior by the edge farms but has no incentive to do so. While middle-farm 
behavior affects edge-farm profits, edge farms have no capacity to manipulate behavior by the 
middle farm. Therefore, the order of movement by producers has no effect on equilibrium.  
One aspect of the three-farm linear topology generalizes to the N-farm linear topology; 
namely, the irrelevance of first-movement by an edge farm when compared with simultaneous 
moves. However, the order of movement by interior farms is relevant as the following analysis 
of the four-farm linear topology illustrates.15 In it, the reaction functions are given by  
(27) 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 2
3 2 3 3 4 3 4 4
Farm 1: ; Farm 2 : 2 ;
Farm 3: 2 ; Farm 4 : .
a a a a a a
a a a a a a
λ λ
λ λ
+ = + =
+ = + =  
If 1 2 3 4 0λ λ λ λ λ= = = = > , then symmetry under simultaneous movement implies * *1 4a a=  and 
* *
2 3a a=  so that the only symmetric positive actions equilibrium for the middle farms is given by 
* *
2 3 1 1a a λ= = + −  and the edge farms react according to * *1 4 / 1a a λ λ= = + .  
If farms 1 or 4 move first, (27) shows that equilibrium will not change. Suppose, though, that 
farm 2 moves first. Farm 3 reacts according to 3 2/(2 )a aλ= + . As with Stackelberg oligopoly, 
the early mover will force responsibility onto the later mover. In the case of an oligopoly, the 
responsibility concerns controlling market output. In our case, it concerns controlling spread of 
disease from farm 4. Farm 4 may well benefit because its only neighbor is forced to take more 
care. Farm 1, on the other hand, is more likely to lose from the farm 2 endeavor to manipulate 
farm 3 caretaking.  
                                                 
15 This is the graph in figure 2 except that there are four dots, three connecting lines, and two 
middle farms.  
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External Security 
For our external security model, presented around equation (19), we consider a two-farm region 
and compare a simultaneous-moves equilibrium with the case in which farm 1 moves first. When 
farm 1 decides first, then it will recognize its capacity to manipulate the farm 2 action. In 
particular, if farm 1 acts then farm 2 will act whenever 21 σ ρ− > . When both act, then profit to 
farm 1 is 1 1V c− . If farm 1 acts and 21 σ ρ− ≤ , then profit to farm 1 is 1 1V cσ − . If farm 1 does 
not act and 2 2σ σ ρ− >  then profit to farm 1 is 1Vσ . Finally, if farm 1 does not act and 2σ σ−  
2ρ≤  then profit to farm 1 is 21Vσ . 
Summarizing, there are three critical regions for the value of 2ρ . These are  
(28) 2 22 2 2) : ; ) : 1 ; ) : 1 ;A B Cρ σ σ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ< − − ≤ < − − ≤  
and are depicted in panel a) of figure 8. For area A , farm 1 can be sure that farm 2 will act 
regardless of the farm 1 decision. Therefore the increment in farm 1 profit due to action is 
1 1 1V c Vσ− − , so that the farm acts if 11 σ ρ− > . This is area A′  (the sum of areas C ′  and 
A C′ ′− ) in panel b) of figure 8. For area B , as given in (28), farm 2 replicates the decision of 
farm 1. The increment in farm 1 profit is 21 1 1V c Vσ− − , so that the farm acts if 2 11 σ ρ− > . This 
is area B′  (the sum [ ] [ ]C A C B A′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ − + − ) in panel b), and area A′  is a subset. The third area 
identified in (28), labeled C , is where farm 2 will not act regardless of the prior farm 1 action. 
Action by farm 1 then changes own profit by 21 1 1V c Vσ σ− −  so that the action will be taken 
whenever 2 1σ σ ρ− > . This parameter area, labeled as C′ , is contained in area A′  so that 
C A B′ ′ ′⊆ ⊆ .  
One may think of this parameter space containment as follows. The set 1( , ) Cσ ρ ′∈  contains 
values for which the leader will take the action anyway, i.e., even when farm 2 will not follow. 
The set difference A C′ ′−  is an expansion of set C′ . It accounts for the recognition that in this 
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case farm 1 knows that farm 2 will take the action anyway, where the actions complement. Set 
B A′ ′−  is an expansion of set A′ , and the motive for this expansion is strategic. In this case, farm 
1 takes the action only because farm 2 is then coaxed into acting. This strategic motive for 
communication has arisen elsewhere for models of a form similar to ours. It is related to the 
notion of seed money in a fund-raising drive (Andreoni, 1998; Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund, 
2005). More directly, in Hennessy, Roosen, and Miranowski (2001) the issue is quality protection 
for a food system when surplus is shared according to the Shapley value. In two papers by Winter 
(2005, 2006), the design of workplace structure in the form of job hierarchies and office layout 
such that communication is facilitated is found to elicit better performance from workers. 
A comparison with simultaneous moves is in order. There, for 1 2ρ ρ< , firm 1 moves if 
2
1σ σ ρ− ≥  and firm 2 moves if 21 σ ρ− ≥ . The one difference between simultaneous moves and 
first movement by farm 1 is the absence of the strategic incentive, as identified in area B A′ ′−  of 
figure 8, panel b). In that area, joint profit changes from 2 21 2V Vσ σ+  to 1 2 1V V c+ −  2c− . For the 
parameter values in question the change is positive and, furthermore, the profits of both farms 
increase. Thus leadership by one farm, and it can be either farm, cannot decrease profits for either 
farm relative to simultaneous moves and may increase profits for both.  
Finally, suppose that 1 2ρ ρ<  and a policymaker can influence which, if it must be one or the 
other, farm moves first. When farm 1 moves first then there are three regions to consider:  
(29) 
{ }
{ }
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2 1 2 1
2 2
1 2
) :  both act               1   and  1 , Joint profit is ;
) :  farm 1 only acts     and  1 , Joint profit is ;
) :  neither act otherwise, Joint profit is .
A V V c c
B V V c
C V V
σ ρ σ ρ
σ σ ρ σ ρ σ σ
σ σ
− > − > + − −
− > − ≤ + −
+
 
Figure 9, panel a), describes the choice set in 1 2( , ) (0,0)ρ ρ ≥  space where farm 1 moves first and 
condition 1 2ρ ρ<  precludes from consideration the wedge below the bisector.  
On the other hand, when farm 2 moves first then joint profits are 
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(30) 
{ }
{ }
2
1 2 1 2 2 1
2 2
1 2 1 2 1
2 2
1 2
) :     1   and  1 ;
) :      1   and  ;
) :           otherwise.
A V V c c
B V V c
C V V
σ ρ σ ρ
σ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ
σ σ
+ − − − > − >
+ − − ≤ − >
+
 
Notice that the profit possibilities are the same, but the areas change.16 Panel b) shows how this 
occurs. Area A, per (29), expands by rectangle B CR R+ , where BR  switches from that of action 
by farm 1 only to that of action by both farms and CR  switches from that of action by neither 
farm to that of action by both farms. 
Considering area CR , joint surplus changes from 2 21 2V Vσ σ+  to 1 2 1 2V V c c+ − − . Since both 
2
21 σ ρ− >  and 2 11 σ ρ− >  in CR , we can be sure that 2 21 2 1 2 1 2V V c c V Vσ σ+ − − > + . Not only 
does joint surplus increase but also both farms gain from leadership by farm 2 rather than farm 1. 
It may seem surprising that farm 2 should lead when 1 2ρ ρ< , and the reason is illuminating. In 
this area, the farm iρ  values are sufficiently close that strengthening farm 2 incentives (through 
getting it to internalize more consequences of its action by leading) elicits action by farm 2. This 
occurs because farm 2 anticipates that farm 1 will then act upon seeing an increase in marginal 
private value of its own action, as a consequence of the prior farm 2 action. 
Considering area BR , joint surplus changes from 1 2 1V V cσ σ+ −  to 1 2 1 2V V c c+ − − . Writing 
the change in joint surplus as 1 2 2(1 ) (1 )V Vσ σ ρ− + − − , we are sure that 2 2(1 ) 0V σ ρ− − <  on 
interior points of BR . By contrast with area CR , the leader would prefer to follow. While 
1(1 ) 0V σ− >  on interior points of BR , the value of 1V  can be an arbitrarily small positive 
number so that circumstances exist where leadership by farm 2 reduces joint surplus. This occurs 
                                                 
16 Farm 2 never has the incentive to act alone when it moves first. This is because 2 2σ σ ρ− >  
implies 2 1σ σ ρ− >  whenever 2 1ρ ρ> . That leading farm 2 will not act alone distinguishes (30) 
from (29). In (30), the conditions for farm 2 to act are 2 21 σ ρ− >  and 11 σ ρ− >  where the 
second condition is due to the necessity that farm 1 also acts. The only other case where action 
occurs is when farm 1 acts alone, i.e., where 2 1σ σ ρ− >  and 2 21 σ ρ− ≤ . 
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when 1ρ  is comparatively small and 1V  is also small, i.e., 1c  must be very small. In such 
circumstances, it is socially inefficient to elicit action by farm 2 when that farm would have in 
any case benefited from action by farm 1. This is unlikely to apply, however, if scale economies 
exist in the cost of biosecuring.  
 
Discussion 
Comparisons across political and economic systems, as well as across organizational forms, have 
taught us that institutional structure matters in how it modifies human behavior. International and 
national agencies seeking to protect against disease entry have tended to place much emphasis on 
developing public health capacities. Infectious disease epidemics, though, often arise because of 
oversights in system design and/or lapses in human behavior. In order to appreciate such 
biosecurity vulnerabilities, it is necessary to agree upon and understand in some detail the 
economic nature of relevant human behavior. The intent of this paper has been to develop an 
economic model of some human aspects of the infectious disease threat. 
As far as it was developed in this paper, the spread variant of our model was largely 
descriptive. A stronger policy component was developed for the entry variant. In particular, a 
policy to compel at least some growers (in practice, likely the largest growers) to each take a 
biosecuring action may elicit the action from each of the less readily monitored smaller growers. 
In addition, public or private endeavors to communicate dispositions toward a biosecuring action 
concerning entry may well lead to more extensive use of the threat-reducing action.  
Inevitably the model could be adapted to better reflect reality, but at the cost of increasing 
model complexity. The assumption that all parties know the costs and benefits to others could be 
relaxed through positing a Bayesian game version, but the qualitative results should not be 
affected. The model might also be extended to endogenize interactions between scale of 
production and equilibrium disease threat levels, to allow for repeated interactions, and to 
include private actions that reduce the probability of disease exits from a farm. How any scale 
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economies in biosecurity costs might affect behavior is a matter of importance for parts of the 
world where backyard production is widespread. In order to better prepare for animal health 
epidemics, an extension of immediate policy relevance would be to study farm operator 
incentives to report suspect events when the extent of spread is stochastic but partially 
controllable. 
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Figure 1.  Farms located on a circle
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Figure 2. Three farms located on a line
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Figure 3.  Complete coordination failure in simultaneous 
move game to secure region from outside infection
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Figure 4.  Under-provision in simultaneous move 
game to secure region from outside infection
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Figure 5.  First-best choices over space 2( , ) [0,1]σ δ ∈
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Figure 6.  Nash sequential-move choices over space
2( , ) [0,1]σ δ ∈
( , )
[0,1]
σ δ
=
( , )
[0,0]
σ δ
=
( , )
[1,0]
σ δ
=
( , )
[1,1]
σ δ
=
Area '
farm 1 only acts
B
Area '
no farm acts
A
 30
Figure 7.  Non-monotone welfare losses due to 
strategic behavior as            values change 
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Figure 8. Role of communication in coordinating equilibrium
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Figure 9.  Actions and profits when leadership changes from 
farm 1 to farm 2,  
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